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Whose Tradition, Whose Identity?
The politics of constructing





1 UNESCO’s heritage protection efforts have been extended from tangible to intangible
cultural elements (oral traditions, social practices, festivals, rituals, performing arts,
and so forth) following the adoption of the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible
Cultural  Heritage  (hereafter  ICH Convention)  in  2003.  This  convention seeks  to  raise
public  awareness  about  the  importance  of  sustaining  the  world’s  cultural  diversity
against the homogenizing effects of globalization. Stating intangible heritage as the
“mainspring  of  cultural  diversity”  in  its  preamble,  it  calls  upon  States  Parties  to
identify and safeguard intangible heritage located within their territories. While the
ICH Convention only came into force in 2006, 161 states (as of November 2014) have
already become a party to it.1 Furthermore, 317 cultural elements have been inscribed
on its Representative and Urgent Safeguarding Lists so far.2 As such, the Convention is
becoming  more  and  more  influential  in  shaping  intangible  heritage  policies  and
practices in the contemporary world. 
2 The ICH Convention, however, is not without its problems. A growing body of critical
heritage literature has discussed how States Parties, which have a dominant role in its
implementation and administration, often treat intangible heritage as a strategic tool
for nation-building (e.g. Lixinski 2011; Logan 2010; Mountcastle 2010; Munjeri 2009).
Stressing the strong connection between heritage and nationalism, this literature calls
attention to  States  Parties'  use  of  the  Convention to  legitimize and disseminate  an
official version of heritage for the promotion of national unity and identity. Such state
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dominance may also lead to the exclusion of alternative interpretations of heritage,
especially  the  heritages  of  marginalized  groups  (national  minorities,  immigrants,
indigenous people, etc.) and/or allow for the assertion of state ownership over their
heritage,  leading  to  the  denial  of  their  distinct  pasts,  identities,  and  cultures.  This
article  discusses  the  case  of  Nevruz to  explore  these  politico-nationalistic  issues
surrounding the making of intangible heritage.
3 Nevruz is the official Turkish name of a festival celebrated around the time of the vernal
equinox, 21 March, in various Asian and Middle Eastern cultures to welcome the spring
season.3 Even though there are many accounts as to the roots of the festival, a widely
accepted version claims that it was originated as the New Year festival of Zoroastrians
in Ancient Persia before Islam. The festival continued to be celebrated in Iran after the
arrival of  Islam and was adopted by other countries in the region (E.  J.  Brill’s  First
Encyclopedia of Islam 1987: 888). While the festival is observed in various forms, picnics
in  open  areas,  preparation  of  special  dishes,  traditional folk  music  and  dance
performances, and visits to cemeteries, the elderly and neighbours are some activities
that are typically held during the festival. 
4 The  festival’s  history  in  Turkey,  however,  shows  how  even  such  modest  traditions
might incorporate strong political meanings over time. Especially after the 1980s, this
festival came to gain widespread political appeal among Turkey’s Kurds as a powerful
symbol of Kurdish identity and nationalism. “Newroz” (the Kurdish name of the festival)
has played a salient role in mobilizing Kurds for national causes ever since, providing
an occasion for them to demand recognition of their distinct identity.  The political
overtones of the festival, however, have made it a very controversial public celebration
in Turkey.
5 One of the most problematic relations of the Turkish state has no doubt been with its
Kurdish population.4 While Turkey has the largest Kurdish population in the world,
estimated at between 12 and 15 million people (Bozarslan 2008: 334),  Kurds are not
officially recognized as a separate ethnic or minority group in Turkey. This has to do
with the institutionalization of a single identity model since the establishment of the
Turkish Republic in 1923 that has represented the nation as both ethnically Turkish
and Sunni Muslim, with the exception of the recognition of Armenian, Greek Orthodox,
and  Jewish  populations  as  non-Muslim  minorities.  This  official  denial  of  Kurdish
identity has provoked constant opposition from Turkey’s Kurds, who have repeatedly
risen up against the state efforts to integrate them into Turkish national identity.
Turkey’s  Kurdish  issue  took  a  more  violent  turn  after  the  1980s,  when  the  PKK
(Kurdistan Workers Party) launched a guerrilla war attacking both state and civilian
targets in Turkey. Since then, the struggle between the PKK and Turkish armed forces
has cost about 40,000 lives (Watts 2010: 22). 
6 The PKK adopted the Newroz tradition in the mid-1980s and began to engage in violent
attacks around 21 March especially in the predominantly Kurdish southeastern region
of Turkey. It also called on Kurds to protest against the Turkish state on Newroz days. At
first, the state responded by banning Newroz. The subsequent clashes that took place
between the security forces and participants during the illegal Newroz events resulted
in the death,  injury,  and arrest  of  many.  Having failed to  suppress  the widespread
celebration of  Newroz,  the  state  changed tactics  in  the 1990s.  It  adopted an official
policy to dissociate Newroz from the Kurds. Through the promotion of “Nevruz” as a
Turkish  tradition,  the  state  began  to  organize  nationwide Nevruz activities  (official
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ceremonies with the participation of high-ranking state officials, concerts, drawing and
essay competitions for school children, and so forth). The adoption of the festival as a
national holiday in several Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union further
served to legitimize Turkey’s new Nevruz policy (Yanık 2006: 292). 
7 In  2009  Turkey,  together  with  Azerbaijan,  India,  Iran,  Kyrgyzstan,  Pakistan,  and
Uzbekistan,  successfully  nominated  the  Nevruz festival  for  the  ICH  Convention’s
Representative List as the common heritage of these countries. When describing the
celebration  of  the  festival  in  Turkey,  however,  the  nomination  form  submitted  to
UNESCO made no mention of Kurdish Newroz's customs and practices.5 In what follows,
I discuss the heritagisation of Nevruz within the context of Turkey’s Kurdish question
and as an extension of its official Nevruz policy. I  begin with exploring the complex
intersections between heritage, politics and identity, and its instrumentality in nation-
building.  I  subsequently  give  some  background  to  the  troubled  history  of  Newroz
celebrations  in  Turkey  and  the  state  attempts  from  the  1990s  onwards  to
institutionalize Nevruz.  Drawing on interviews with the state heritage authorities6 as
well  as  the  Nevruz heritage  nomination  form,  I  explore  the  ways  in  which  its
heritagisation  serves  to  legitimize  and  promote  Nevruz at  both  national  and  global
levels  as  the  UNESCO-approved,  that  is,  the  authentic  and  accurate  version  of  the
festival. Overall, the case of Nevruz is significant in illuminating not only the politico-
nationalist mechanisms through which intangible heritage is produced in Turkey, but
also the increasingly critical role played by international heritage instruments in the
legitimization of these mechanisms.
 
I. Intangible Heritage and Nation-Building 
8 Cultural heritage is not something that is just out “there”, free from human concerns
and  practices.  As  Llorenç  Prats  puts  it,  heritage  is  neither  a  “naturally  occurring
phenomenon, nor is it universal … it is in fact a socio-cultural construction, born at a
specific  moment  in  history.”  (Prats  2009:  76).  This  construction  almost  inevitably
involves the selective use of the past for the needs and purposes of present societies
(Ashworth and Graham 2005: 7), and it is through this selective construction process
that  heritage’s  political  function  unfolds.  Heritage  making  always  entails  complex
negotiations  for  control  between  multiple  interest  groups  over  the  process  of
determining which aspects of the past are to be identified, preserved, and managed as
heritage,  as well  as the meanings to be assigned to them. Tunbridge and Ashworth
(1996)  explain  this  negotiation  process  with  the  concept  of  “dissonant  heritage”.
According  to  them,  cultural  heritage  is  intrinsically  dissonant;  since  various  social
groups  tend  to  develop  different  versions  of  the  past,  conflicting  meanings,
interpretations, and uses often overlap in a single heritage tradition, object, or site. 
9 The  dissonance  of  heritage  is  strongly  linked  with  the  active  role  it  plays  in  the
construction, recreation, and legitimation of collective identities. A sense of a shared
past that forms the basis of a collective identity manifests itself in particular cultural
traditions, places, or objects. Anthropologist Annette B. Weiner (1992) has developed
the concept of “inalienable possessions” to explain how the circulation of particular
objects  among  generations  play  a  vital  role  in  the  construction  and  recreation  of
collective identities, a process that makes these objects intrinsic to the identities of
their possessors. In his essay “Identity as a Scarce Resource”,  Simon Harrison (1999)
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extends  Weiner’s  argument  from  material  objects  to  include  an  understanding  of
symbolic  practices  (dress  styles,  music,  songs,  sacred  sites,  religious  expressions,
festivals,  ceremonies,  and  so  forth). Harrison  labels  these  symbolic  practices  as
“identity  symbols”  and  discusses  the  significance  of  collective  claims  over  their
possession  and  control  for  the  manifestation  and  maintenance  of  distinct  group
identities. This, for him, reveals the exclusive, contested, and politically charged nature
of  these  identity  symbols;  given  that,  identities  rest  on  maintaining  an  exclusive
relationship with symbolic practices, they thus have the power to prevent outsiders
from reproducing these markers of identity (Harrison 1999: 243).
10 Even though Harrison  does  not  specifically  discuss  cultural  heritage  as  an  identity
symbol,  critical  heritage  literature  has  long  been  claiming  it  as  a  vehicle  for
constructing a  shared identity,  belongingness,  and unity  as  well  as  for  manifesting
difference and particularity. The process of identity formation is driven both by the
politics of inclusion and exclusion: identity is a meaning ascribed both to similarity and
difference, as Peralta and Anico remind us, “in order to identify with some, people also
need to dis-identify  with someone else” (Peralta  and Anico 2009:  1).  As  an identity
symbol, then, heritage can unite as well as it can divide (Silverman and Ruggles 2007:
3).  Whereas  it  encourages  unity  and  belonging  among  some  people,  it  does  so  by
excluding some others from its ownership. In the words of Tunbridge and Ashworth: 
At  its  simplest,  all  heritage  is  someone’s  heritage  and  therefore  logically  not
someone else’s:  the original  meaning of  an inheritance implies  the existence of
disinheritance and by extension any creation of heritage from the past disinherits
someone completely or partially, actively or potentially (Tunbridge and Ashworth
1996: 21).
11 This politics of inheritance and disinheritance manifests itself very clearly in nation-
building. Strengthening a sense of national identity and unity among diverse groups of
people is fundamental to any nation-building project.  Heritage serves as a powerful
tool for nation-building in this respect. As Graham et al. have suggested, “imagining of
an internal national homogeneity... draws inevitably upon a particular representation
of heritage and a mythology of the past for its coherence and legitimacy” (Graham et al
2000:  56).  Heritage  encourages  national  identity  and  unity  through  a  particular
representation of the past that promotes a common history, shared memories, values,
and traditions, in an effort to produce a national whole that transcends cultural, ethnic,
and religious differences, or any other particularisms occurring within the nation. In a
study based on a fieldwork she conducted among Hungarian folk revivalists, Mary N.
Taylor discusses how the efforts to preserve traditional folk dance/music as Hungarian
intangible heritage contributes to the country’s nation-building process by boosting a
sense  of  Hungarianness  among  urban  citizens  and  Hungarian  minorities  in  the
neighbouring countries. As she explains, for three decades, the folk revival initiated by
the táncház movement led to the flood of folk revivalists into the remote Hungarian
villages in Romania in search for “masters” to teach them the “authentic” folk dance/
music in traditional settings. These efforts have been institutionalized following the
1990s  as  weeklong  summer  camps  in  these  villages,  where  thousands  of  urban
Hungarians learn to master folk dance/music as their “mother tongue” (Taylor 2009:
47).  According to Taylor,  by fostering a sense of national identity and unity among
Hungarian citizens  and Hungarian minorities  in  Romania,  these  efforts  to  preserve
intangible heritage contribute to not only the reproduction of the nation but also the
reconsideration of ethno-national boundaries (Taylor 2009: 49). 
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12 National heritage, however, excludes as well as includes. According to Logan et al., the
states promote national heritage as part of a strategy to strengthen a sense of shared
national identity and to integrate minority groups into the national mainstream (Logan
et al 2010: 10-11). In this respect, national heritage is deployed as a powerful political
tool not only in constructing a homogenized national whole, but also in denying the
distinctiveness of minority groups from it. In her study of Burma’s heritage protection
programs,  Janette  Philp  discusses  how  the  country’s  authoritarian  military  rule
engages in heritage protection to achieve its own nation-building goals. According to
Philp, these programs operate as a strong political tool in forcing Burma’s ethnic and
religious  minorities  to  conform  to  a  homogenized  national  identity  that  is  both
Buddhist  and  ethnically  Burman  (Philp  2010:  83).  She  discusses  three  different
strategies  adopted  by  the  military  rule  to  this  end,  all  of  which  are  aimed toward
denying minority groups' own sense of history and identity: the promotion of an ethos
of “unity in diversity” that allows these groups to express cultural diversity so long as
it does not challenge national identity; the destruction of the heritage of minorities to
deny their right to assert cultural particularity; and the assimilation of minorities into
a national identity, wherein their heritage is redefined as national heritage (Philp 2010:
85).
13 While UNESCO has been at the forefront of cultural heritage issues especially following
the adoption of the World Heritage Convention in 1972,7 a particular concern has been
expressed in critical heritage literature about the use of its heritage programs for the
purposes of nation-building. States Parties play a dominant role in the implementation
and administration of the UNESCO's heritage programs. While these programs operate
on global, national, and local levels, since international law is made by nation-states,
the national (i.e. state) level remains primary to their enactment (Blake 2009: 47). 
14 The ICH Convention is no exception to this. It was, in fact, meant to depart from a top-
down approach to  heritage management  by facilitating the participation of  culture
bearers  in  the  decision-making  process.  Indeed,  their  vital  role  in  the  making  of
intangible heritage, and the centrality of this form of heritage to their shared sense of
identity and belonging, is recognized in the texts and documents of the Convention
(Blake 2009). It likewise develops a community-based approach in defining the scope of
intangible heritage, stating in Article 2(1) that only the cultural elements identified by
culture bearers (and not by the experts or state heritage authorities) as their shared
heritage can be considered intangible  heritage by UNESCO.  Furthermore,  Article  15
invites States Parties to secure the widest possible involvement of culture bearers in
the management of their intangible heritage, and the criteria for the inscription on the
intangible  heritage  lists  asks  States  Parties  to  prepare  nominations  with  their  full
participation.
15 Despite these measures, however, States Parties still remain the leading actors in the
ICH  Convention.  The  state  heritage  authorities  make  most  of  the  crucial  decisions
regarding the identification and management of intangible heritage. In most cases, the
Ministries  of  Culture  or  other  relevant  state  institutions  function  as  the  executive
bodies of the Convention at the national level. They decide on the cultural elements to
be identified and proposed as intangible heritage to the Intangible Heritage Lists, as
well  as  the  meanings  to  be  attributed  to  these  elements.  Furthermore,  the
Intergovernmental Committee to the Convention posits the definition of community as
unnecessary,  considering  the  one  adopted  by  the  state  heritage  authorities  to  be
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adequate in showing community participation in decision-making (Lixinski 2011: 85). In
this respect, the decision of how to define the bearers of a cultural element and who,
which groups or individuals, will be included and excluded from participation in the
decision-making process also rests with state heritage authorities. 
16 Such  state  sovereignty  prevents  the  Convention  from  offering  remedies  for  its
misappropriation  by  States  Parties  (Lixinski  2011:  94),  and  this  has  serious
repercussions for national minorities. It may come at the expense of the absence or
underrepresentation  of  minority  heritage  within  UNESCO’s  intangible  heritage
program (Alivizatou 2012: 41). More severely, playing into the hands of assimilationist
states  (Marrie  2009:  178),  this  program may serve to support  the assertion of  state
ownership  over  minority  heritage,  leading  to  the  denial  of  minority  identities  and
cultural values. As such, the ICH Convention, like the World Heritage Convention, by
enhancing instead of overcoming “nation-state-based power structures and nationalist
agendas”, operates as a tool for cultural domination (Askew 2010: 20).
17 Several  scholars  have  already  explored  these  complex  politico-nationalistic  issues
surrounding  UNESCO’s  intangible  heritage  program  for  instance,  through  an
examination of the ways in which it aids ongoing Chinese state efforts to incorporate
the Tibetan identity into the Chinese national identity (e.g. Lixinski 2011; Mountcastle
2010). Similarly, William Logan (2010) explores how the inscription of the Tay Nguyen
minority’s gong music into the UNESCO list by the Vietnamese government actually
serves  for  integrating  them  into  the  mainstream.  In  a  study  on  Balkan  Romani
musicians,  Carol  Silverman discusses  how the  exclusion  of  Roma cultural  practices
from Macedonia’s UNESCO application to list the wedding festival of Galicnik village as
the Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity contributes to the country’s
nation building goals.8 As she suggests, while these practices are an integral part of the
Galicnik Wedding Festival, and the villagers are dependent on Roma musicians for their
dance, ritual, and ceremonial music, “UNESCO application hardly mentions Roma and
omits them in relation to the goals of affirming cultural identity” (Silverman 2012: 171).
Nevruz provides yet another strong case for elaborating on the link between the state,
nation-building, and intangible heritage. Before moving on to discuss the heritagisation
process  of  the  festival,  however,  I  will  first  give  some  background  to  its  troubled
history in Turkey. 
 
II. Newroz versus Nevruz 
18 While historically Nevruz was a traditional celebration in Turkish culture, it was not
adopted as  an  official  festivity  by  the  Turkish  state  until  the  1990s  (Demirer  2005:
146-147). Nevruz was celebrated widely as a public holiday in the Ottoman Empire (E. J.
Brill’s First Encyclopedia of Islam 1987: 888). It was, however, neither recognized as
national heritage by the Turkish state, nor was it celebrated publicly in the early years
of the Republic. In fact, prior to the adaption of Newroz by Kurds as a protest event in
the late 1970s, it had only been referred to as an Iranian tradition in the mainstream
newspapers  (Yanık  2006:  287).  An  article  published  in  daily  Milliyet9 in  1953,  for
instance, described Nevruz as the “traditional and national festival of Iranians”, when
announcing  the  celebration  to  be  held  at  the  Iranian  Embassy  the  following  day.10 
Nevruz events organized by Iranians in Turkey, telegrams sent by state authorities to
Iranian consuls, and series of descriptive articles on the history and customs of Nevruz
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in Iran were reported by Milliyet for more than two decades. By the late 1970s articles
about Newroz celebrations held by some Marxist Kurdish organizations began to appear
on newspaper pages. In 1977, Milliyet briefly mentioned Kurdish demonstrations to be
held  against  the  Turkish  state  in  Italy.11 A  year  later,  it  reported  on  the  protests
organized in Ankara on Newroz day, and on the slogans (“long live Kurdistan”, “death to
slavery, long live freedom”) that had been written in Kurdish on Ankara University
buildings under the pseudonym Kawa.12 
19 Kurds have been celebrating Newroz for centuries as their New Year, Sersal (Gunes 2012:
77). One of the first texts that mentions Newroz is Shahnameh, written in the 11th century
by the Persian poet Ferdowsi, who cites it as the day Persian king Jamshid came to the
throne (Hür 2012: § 3). Ahmad-i Khani’s famous Kurdish epic poem Mem û Zîn (1690)
also mentions its celebration by Kurds (Hür 2012: § 6). Newroz, however, neither was a
politicized event, nor served as an identity symbol until its association with the ancient
Kurdish legend of Kawa in the 1950s by the Kurdish nationalist movements in Iran and
Iraq.13 The version of the legend now commonly accepted among Kurds narrates the
story of  Kawa the blacksmith,  who leads  a  successful  revolt  against  the  oppressive
Assyrian King Dehak, liberates the ancestors of Kurds from his tyranny and lights a
bonfire on the top of a hill to let everyone know that Dehak has been killed. Kawa’s
defeat of Dehak brings spring back to the region after centuries. Today, all the Kurdish
movements in the Middle East accept this legend as the common founding myth of
Kurds and celebrate Newroz as a national day to honor Kawa (Bozarslan 2002: 843). 
20 While Newroz celebrations, usually in the form of picnics in the countryside, persisted
among Kurds in southeastern Turkey following the foundation of the Turkish Republic,
these events were neither widespread nor charged with political meanings (Aydın 2005:
69-70). The first attempts to turn Newroz into a national event among Turkey’s Kurds
emerged in the late 1970s. Kurdish intellectuals and students that organized around
Marxist organizations sought out distinguishing characteristics of Kurdishness, and to
this end, following the example of Kurdish movements in Iran and Iraq that associate
Newroz with the Kawa legend, they declared Newroz as a Kurdish national festival to
commemorate  the  victory  of  Kawa  (Aydın  2014:  76).  Favoring  the  formation  of  an
independent state, these organizations aimed to strengthen an awareness of a common
Kurdish identity with historical  claims and cultural and linguistic distinctiveness.  It
was during this period that many Kurdish journals and books were published about the
origin and history of Kurds, the Kurdish language and Kurdish customs and traditions
becoming the center of attention (Aydın 2014: 76). Newroz was resurrected as a myth of
origin within this context, explaining the emergence of Kurds as a nation and providing
a powerful means of claiming Kurdish difference (Gunes 2012: 77). Just as the day Kurds
were emancipated from oppression and achieved their freedom, Newroz also presented
a  “myth  of  resistance”  (Hirschler  2001:  154),  symbolizing  the  Kurdish  struggle  for
independence  against  the  Turkish  state.  Although  attempts  by  these  Kurdish
organizations were significant in the redefinition of Newroz as a Kurdish myth of origin
and resistance, the actual revival of Newroz as a widespread mass phenomenon took
place following its adoption by the PKK. 
21 The PKK was founded in 1978 under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan with the goal of
establishing an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. It adopted Newroz as
a  symbol  of  resistance  following  the  suicide  of  PKK prisoner  Mazlum Doğan on 21
March 1982, who had hanged himself in protest against the conditions of Diyarbakır
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prison and was named the “contemporary Kawa” by the PKK (Aydın 2014: 78). When
the PKK began a series of systematic armed actions against the Turkish state in 1984,
the attacks were especially coordinated around the time of Newroz. During Newroz in
1986,  for  instance,  34  soldiers  and  civilians,  and  12  PKK  members  died  in  clashes
between  the  PKK  and  Turkish  armed  forces  in  southeastern  Turkey.14 From  the
mid-1980s onwards,  Newroz came to be at the forefront of  attention in Turkey.  The
country was on “Nevruz alarm” every March; additional troops and security forces were
allocated to the southeast, and the media and state authorities constantly warned the
public against possible PKK attacks. 
22 The PKK also  used Newroz as  a  unifying  national  myth to  heighten awareness  of  a
distinct Kurdish identity and to engender national consciousness, calling on Kurds to
publicly celebrate Newroz. These celebrations played a key role not only in the public
manifestation of Kurdish identity, but also in mobilizing political support for the PKK.
While the celebrations were banned by the state, many Kurds poured onto the streets
shouting pro-Kurdish and pro-PKK slogans,  dancing and singing Kurdish traditional
songs and jumping over bonfires in commemoration of the victory of Kawa. Various
Kurdish  politicians  and  activists  delivered  speeches  on  the  meaning  of  Newroz for
Kurdish identity and culture. The celebrations often turned violent when the security
forces attempted to disperse the crowds. Clashes with them led to the death, injury,
and arrest of many Newroz participants.15
23 Unable to prevent the celebration of Newroz by banning it, the Turkish state adopted a
different strategy in the 1990s, recognizing Nevruz as a Turkish spring holiday in order
to dissociate the festival from the Kurdish identity and the national movement.16 To
this end, the Turkish Ministry of Culture issued a notice on 21 March 1991, declaring
Nevruz to be a tradition rooted in ancient Asian Turkish culture and requesting that
provincial  culture  directories  across  Turkey  organize  annual  official  Nevruz
celebrations  from  that  year  on.17 Following  this  notice,  state  institutions,  the
mainstream media, and various Turkish nationalist groups embarked upon an intensive
campaign to prove the festival’s Turkishness. 
24 As Lerna K. Yanık points out, after the 1990s the Turkish state devoted considerable
efforts toward justifying the adoption of Nevruz as a Turkish tradition by linking its
origin to Central Asia, the overall objective being to de-emphasize Kurdish affiliation
with Newroz and counterbalance Kurdish nationalism (Yanık 2006: 288). Hence the state
officially adopted the claim promoted in some politically marginal nationalist circles
that the origin of Nevruz was derived from the Turkish national myth of Ergenekon,
which refers to the legendary homeland of pre-Islamic Turks in the isolated mountains
of Central Asia.18 According to the legend, the few remaining Turks that had survived a
fatal battle took refuge in Ergenekon. They were trapped in the region for centuries
until they grew in numbers and were able to return to their homeland with the help of
a blacksmith who melted an iron mountain and a grey wolf  who showed them the
passage out. Their escape from Ergenekon marked the arrival of spring. Since then,
Turks have considered the first day of spring to be Nevruz, celebrating it as the day they
left Ergenekon and gained their independence. 
25 Meanwhile, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent states of
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, —with whom the
Turkish state assumes a common history and culture and are referred to as “Turkic
Republics”  (Heper  and Criss  2009:  313)— adopted Nevruz as  a  national  holiday.  The
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widespread celebration of Nevruz in these countries were viewed by state elites not only
as  additional  proof of  the  festival’s  Turkish/Turkic  roots,  but  also  as  a  means  of
establishing  closer  ties  with  them  (Yanık  2006:  285-286).  Various  Nevruz events,
therefore, were organized together with the Central Asian Republics from the 1990s
onwards.  The  first  event  of  this  kind  was  held  on  21  March  1993,  when  Turkey
organized an international  congress titled “Friendship,  Fraternity and Collaboration
among  Turkish  States  and  Communities”  with  the  participation  of  Turkey’s  high
ranking state and government officials and over eight hundred representatives from
the Central Asian Republics and Turkish communities in Asia and the Balkans.19 In his
speech during the event,  the then Prime Minister  Süleyman Demirel  wished happy
Nevruz to  the  entire  “Turkish”  world,  naming  Nevruz as  the  celebration  of  the
Ergenekon legend surviving from one generation to the next.20 After watching a movie
depicting the legend of  Ergenekon,  event  participants  forged iron on an anvil  as  a
symbol of Turks' departure from the region.21 Two years later, Turkey organized the
first  “Nevruz feast” in Ankara with the collaboration of TURKSOY, the International
Organization of Turkic Culture.22 The event hosted the Culture Ministers of Azerbaijan,
Bashkortostan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, and Tatarstan, and included activities such as
official parades and folk dance performances from guest countries.23 Since then joint
Nevruz celebrations  with  the  Central  Asian  Republics  have  become  a  tradition  in
Turkey. 
26 The past two decades have also seen a growth in one-sided academic works supporting
the official state view on Nevruz. A short essay titled “Nevruz in Turkish Culture” that
appeared in the Turkish Review Quarterly  Digest,  a scholarly journal published by the
Turkish Directorate General of Press and Information, stated as early as 1992 that,
The history of Nevruz is as old as Turkish history … The beginning of Nevruz goes
back to the Legend of Ergenekon ... 21 March, the day when winter ends and spring
starts,  and the  Turks  announced their  independence  is  celebrated  as  a  festival.
Khazakhs, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Uzbeks, and Tatars from Central Asia, and Anatolian,
Azerbaijani and Balkan Turks continue the Nevruz tradition to the present day … We
can say that Nevruz is a truly unique Turkish tradition. (pp. 51-52, emph. added)
27 Since then, similar arguments have been made in a plethora of publications to justify
Turkey’s  official  Nevruz policy.  A  typical  publication  of  this  sort  begins  with  the
definition of Nevruz as a common traditional cultural value among Turks and goes on to
prove this by evoking the Ergenekon myth and citing various historical texts on Turks.
Many such publications also claim the Turkish origins of Nevruz, arguing that Iranians
adopted the tradition from the Turkish tribes that had migrated from Central Asia (e.g.
Bayat  2008;  Kafkasyalı  2005).  This  discussion is  usually  followed by a  list  of  Nevruz
practices in various other “Turkish” or “Turkic” Republics and their similarities with
Turkey’s  Nevruz tradition.  Different  names  and  practices  attributed  to  Nevruz
celebrations in various regions of  Turkey are also cited at  length and in detail  but
without mention of  the Kurdish ones (e.g.  Karaman 2008;  Uca 2007).  Moreover,  the
practices  attributed  to  Newroz are  often  highlighted  as  being  genuinely  Turkish:
jumping  over  a  bonfire,  for  instance,  is  claimed  as  an  ancient  Turkish  tradition
signifying the purification of  the body and mind (Özdemir 2006).  The fact  that  the
celebration  of  the  festival  was  forbidden  for  a  long  time  in  Turkey  is  hardly  ever
mentioned  in  these  works  and  if  so  only  implicitly  such  as  to  state  that,  “the
celebrations  in  Turkey were interrupted from time to  time” (Bayat  2008:  148).  The
Kurdish version of the festival is only mentioned occasionally and as a distortion of the
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original Turkish tradition —again, without mentioning the words “Kurd” or “Newroz”.
Nebi  Özdemir,  for  instance,  argues  that  “Nevruz will  be  purified  from  all  sorts  of
political and ideological distortions that we call ‘cultural pollution’ and will continue to
be celebrated in its original meaning” (Özdemir 2006: 18). 
28 The  Turkish  state  had  also  begun  to  organize  official  festivities  in  the  southeast
following the 1990s, in an effort to disseminate the Nevruz tradition among Kurds. A
typical celebration of this kind would be attended by high-ranking government and
state officials (including military personnel) who gave messages of solidarity and peace
in  their  speeches  and performed what  was  officially  considered to  be  “old  Turkish
Nevruz customs” such as jumping over a bonfire or forging iron on an anvil. Several
measures were employed to encourage Kurdish participation. These state-sponsored
events were widely publicized through national television, radio, posters, and flyers,
and free gifts were given away. In 1994, for instance, security forces invited the people
of Cizre, a small town in the southeast, to the official Nevruz celebrations during which
event military and police officers made speeches warning participants against the PKK,
assisted  them  in  lighting  bonfires,  and  distributed  Turkish  flags  and  chocolate  to
children.24 At this event a high-ranking army officer stated that, “we celebrate Nevruz
too,  but  under  the  Turkish flag”.25 Big-budget  and fancy spectacles  were  organized
occasionally.  The  1996  Nevruz celebration  held  in  Iğdır  (a  small  town  on  Turkey’s
eastern border) with the participation of the then Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, for
example,  involved  concerts  by  famous  singers,  firework  displays,  and  folk  dance
performances, and the event was streamed live on various TV channels.26 
29 Despite  all  these  efforts,  however,  Kurdish  participation  in  these  state-sponsored
events remained quite low. Many Kurds chose rather to gather in alternative Newroz
celebrations organized by pro-Kurdish parties.27 These celebrations were planned in
various cities and towns across the country by the “Newroz Organization Committees”
composed of pro-Kurdish party members and Kurdish activists. These committees were
responsible for developing the Newroz program schedule, deciding on the activities to
be  held  and people  to  be  invited,  and obtaining the  official  permits  and approvals
necessary for organizing public celebrations in Turkey. Newroz applications, however,
were occasionally rejected by state authorities for security reasons or were subjected to
serious restrictions as to how, when, and where the celebrations could be held. 
30 State authorities implemented various measures for diminishing the participation to
Newroz. Occasionally, when 21 March fell on a weekday, permission was denied for the
celebration of Newroz on a weekend, or locations far from the city center and with no
public transportation were assigned for the celebration site. Newroz participants had to
go through ID checks and security procedures before entering the celebration areas,
which were closed down by barricades and surrounded by security forces. Any symbols
or actions that could be associated with the PKK and the Kurdish identity were banned.
PKK and Kurdish flags, Öcalan’s posters, banners in Kurdish, and accessories with the
Kurdish tri-colors (yellow, green, and red) were prohibited in the celebration areas and
seized by the police. The security forces interfered when the crowds shouted slogans in
Kurdish,  in  favor  of  the  PKK and Öcalan,  or  against  the  Turkish  state.  When state
authorities  did  not  issue  a  permit  for  the  celebrations,  thousands  gathered  in
unauthorized ones. In 1999, for instance, 11,000 people participated in unauthorized
Newroz celebrations throughout Turkey and 2,400 of them were taken into custody.28 
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31 Amidst these tightened restrictions and regulations, Newroz has become more and more
popular among Turkey’s Kurds as a symbol of identity, and its nationwide celebrations
have drawn ever-increasing crowds of all ages and social backgrounds. Today, a typical
Newroz celebration  begins  with  the  speeches  of  prominent  Kurdish  politicians and
activists on the significance of Newroz for the Kurdish identity and national movement,
criticizing the state’s Kurdish policy and demanding the official recognition of Kurdish
identity and cultural rights. The event goes on with the commemoration of those who
lost their lives for the Kurdish struggle, deliverance of Öcalan’s Newroz message to the
crowds, and concerts of Kurdish music. The crowds participate by shouting slogans,
waving Kurdish flags, jumping over bonfires, and singing and dancing to traditional
Kurdish  songs.  The  celebrations  in  Diyarbakır  are  especially  significant  not  only
because they attract the most crowds (whose numbers are given in millions), but also
because they include weeklong Newroz themed events ranging from photography and
art  exhibitions,  panels,  conferences,  and  official  receptions  to  concerts  by  famous
Kurdish musicians.  Foreign politicians,  NGO and union representatives and political
activists  also  participate  widely  in  these  celebrations.  Nevertheless,  Newroz still
constitutes  a  major  source  of  conflict  between  the  Turkish  state  and  its  Kurdish
population.29 At the same time, the state pursues its official Nevruz policy and expands
its efforts to promote the festival as a Turkish tradition. The next section explores the
heritagisation of Nevruz as part of these efforts, discussing the ways in which it serves
as a powerful means for legitimizing and promoting Nevruz as the UNESCO-approved
authentic version of the festival at both national and global levels. 
 
III: Intangible Heritage Making of Nevruz
32 The initial  incentive for Nevruz’s  UNESCO nomination came from Iran. In 2004, Iran
called upon countries of the region to jointly nominate the festival for the Masterpieces
of  the Oral  and Intangible Heritage of  Humanity list,  and to this end held a meeting in
Tehran from 7th to 10th August with the participation of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, India,
Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Pakistan,  Tajikistan,  Turkey,  and  Uzbekistan,  to  prepare  a
joint  nomination form (Samadi  Rendi  2008:  110).  The  application was  submitted  to
UNESCO in 2005, but the festival did not make the list due to the incompleteness of the
form and the absence of coordination between the applicant countries.30 Following the
ICH  Convention’s  entrance  into  force,  Azerbaijan,  Iran,  Kyrgyzstan,  Pakistan,
Tajikistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan came together for another meeting in Tehran, 25th
to 27th August  2008,  to revise the nomination form and propose the festival  for  its
inscription on the Convention’s Representative List (Samadi Rendi 2008: 110-111). The
nomination  was  successful  and  in  the  fourth  session  of  the  Intergovernmental
Committee held in Abu Dhabi in 2009 the festival made the list as the common tradition
of applicant countries.
33 While Newroz continues to be celebrated extensively among Kurds all over the Middle
East  and  in  Europe  as  a  potent  symbol  of  their  common  identity  and  history,  the
customs, values, and practices of Newroz were invisible in the heritagisation process.
The festival’s nomination form identified culture bearers of the festival as “all people of
the States Parties  concerned” and its  geographic location was widely recognized as
ranging  from  the  Indian  subcontinent,  Central  Asia  and  the  Mediterranean  to
Southeast  Europe (UNESCO 2009:  2).  Nevertheless,  whilst  the form cites the various
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names that the festival is called in different countries (i.e., Novruz, Nowrouz, Nooruz,
Navruz, Nauroz, and Nevruz), Newroz is not mentioned among them. The fact that the
festival continues to be extensively celebrated by Kurds across Iran, Iraq, Syria, and
Turkey, and is recognized as a national holiday by the Kurdistan Regional Government
of Iraq, was also absent in the nomination form. 
34 The nomination  form is  particularly  illuminating  for an  understanding  of  how the
heritagisation of  the  festival  contributes  to  Turkey’s  official  Nevruz policy.  While  it
details the various names attributed to the festival in Turkey (i.e., Mart Dokuzu, Mart
Bozumu, Sultan Nevruz, Mereke, Yılsırtı, Yeniyıl, Ergenekon Bayramı, Çiğdem Günü, and
Yumurta Bayramı), Newroz is not named among them (UNESCO 2009: 2). The form also
cites the different myths attributed to the festival in Indian, Iranian, and Central Asian
mythologies  and  mentions  the  “famous  Bozkurt  myth”  (another  name  for  the
Ergenekon legend) from Turkey (UNESCO 2009: 2), yet nowhere in the document is the
legend of Kawa mentioned. Moreover, the nomination form also claims jumping over a
bonfire,  a  custom  strongly  associated  with  Newroz,  as  a Turkish  Nevruz tradition
(UNESCO  2009:  3).  Even  the  participation  of  high-ranking  state  officials  in  the
celebrations is presented as a safeguarding measure to sustain Nevruz (UNESCO 2009:
6-7).  In fact,  the word “Kurd” is  found only once throughout the whole document:
“There are some fire  rituals  at  the Eve of  Nowrouz/… among some groups such as
Kurds and Zoroastrians as well as in Turkey and the Central Asian countries” (UNESCO
2009: 3). This statement is particularly interesting because the very existence of Kurds
in  Turkey is  not  even  acknowledged.  In  addition,  referring  to  the  state-sponsored
Nevruz celebrations where the government and state officials  jump over bonfires to
perform “old Turkish customs”,  this  statement is  in line with Turkey’s  attempts to
popularize  and  disseminate  the  traditions  attributed  to  Newroz as  essentially  and
genuinely Turkish.
35 It became apparent during my research that this exclusion of Newroz from the festival’s
heritagisation  process  was  not  accidental.  Indeed,  the  description  of  Nevruz on  the
official  website  of  the  Turkish  Ministry  of  Culture  and  Tourism  (hereafter  TMCT)
clearly demonstrates how its attitude towards the festival has not significantly changed
in the past three decades: 
Although  it  is  has  been  claimed  that  Nevruz was  a  Persian  conception,  it  also
appears in the Twelve Animal Turkish Calendars, and had been known to the Turks
and celebrated by them for a very long time. The principle [sic] view of Nevruz is the
celebration of independence.  In other words that it  marks the day of departure
from Ergenekon. Hence, Nevruz has been accepted as the beginning of the New Year
by  Turks  and  has  still  been  celebrating  [sic]  with  festivals.  Among  the  Turkish
communities of Central Asia, the Azeris, Kazakhs, Khirghiz, Türkmens, Uzbeks and
Uyghur Turks,  the  Anatolian Turks  and the  Balkan Turks  have kept  the  Nevruz
tradition alive up to the present day.31
36 In the interviews, the TMCT officials all agreed with the above quote, explaining how
Turks in Central Asia, Anatolia, and the Balkans have held festivities for centuries to
commemorate their escape from Ergenekon and to welcome the arrival of spring. In
addition,  by  stressing  the  national  character  of  the  festival  and  emphasizing  its
widespread practice by “all the people of Turkey”, any association of the festival with
Kurdish  identity  and  culture  —and,  occasionally  without  reference  to  the  words  “
Newroz” or “Kurd”— was strictly rejected. Indeed, a recurring theme in the interviews
was that while some “groups” in Turkey have attempted to monopolize Nevruz as their
own  tradition,  it  is  never  the  exclusive  property  of  any  “locality”,  but  rather  the
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national  heritage  of  the  whole  country.  One  of  the  TMCT  officials,  for  instance,
explained  the  factors  underlying  their  decision  to  approve  Iran’s  proposal  and
contribute to the nomination process:
There is a deep-rooted Nevruz tradition in Turkey; we thought it was significant to
nominate  a  practice  that  reflects  Turkey’s  whole  national  profile…  Nevruz is  a
practice that does not belong to any locality or specific community in Turkey. All
the people of Turkey are part of this tradition.
37 While the TMCT defines culture bearers of Nevruz as “all the people of Turkey”, Kurds
are  paradoxically  excluded  from  this  definition.  When  specifically  asked  why  the
festival’s nomination form never once mentions Newroz,  respondents replied that its
exclusion was not a political decision, but a purely technical one. I was told that the
TMCT was concerned only with the cultural and artistic aspects of intangible heritage,
its activities falling totally outside the domestic political agenda. In one instance the
interview became quite tense when a TMCT officer refused to answer my questions
about Newroz, stating that: “you should ask it to the politicians; our office deals only
with cultural tasks and not with political projects!” 
38 Other  respondents,  however,  entered  into  long  explanations  as  to  why  Newroz is
excluded from the heritage making of the festival. For them, this exclusion lies not in
the fact that Newroz is celebrated by Kurds per se, but rather that its celebration does
not conform to the “authentic” meaning and function of the festival. I was told that
Nevruz is unique in that it had survived without losing its original form for centuries in
various  cultures  from  Asia  to  the  Balkans  and  is  celebrated  as  a  spring  holiday
symbolizing the revival of nature and promoting values of unity, solidarity, peace, and
tolerance.  While  Turkey’s  official  Nevruz celebrations  were  claimed  to  be  fully
consistent  with  this  authentic  tradition,  Newroz was  seen  as  deviating  from  it.
Respondents  expressed  the  view  that  Kurds  attempted  to  politicize  an  otherwise
politically  neutral  spring  festival  and  highlighted  the  ways  in  which  the  Kurdish
version “doesn’t follow the original tradition,” “doesn’t have the proper format,” or
else Kurds “ascribe inaccurate meanings” to the festival. While it goes without saying
that Turkey’s official Nevruz activities are no less “political” than Newroz celebrations,
the former was referred as the “unpoliticized” and “authentic” form conforming to the
purely cultural experience of the festival. Overall, the TMCT officials emphasized that
they were not  against  the celebration of  the festival  by Kurds,  but  if  they were to
celebrate it, they should do so in its authentic form. Hence, Kurds were invited once
more  to  celebrate  Nevruz instead  of  Newroz,  but  this time  to  respect  its  UNESCO-
approved authentic tradition. This view is well summarized by a TMCT official:
I am not at liberty to express my thoughts due to my position, but let me say that
we  are  not  claiming  Nevruz merely  as  the  cultural  heritage  of  Turks.  It  is  the
cultural heritage of all the Middle Eastern and Central Asian people. It symbolizes
the arrival of the spring season; its symbolic meaning is unity and solidarity. The
UNESCO declaration proves this.  We do not say that Kurds should not celebrate
Nevruz, but they should respect its tradition. The UNESCO process shows that fake
ideological and political meanings assigned to the festival are meant to fade away. 
39 UNESCO’s  decision  to  inscribe  the  festival  on  the  Representative  List  was  often
mentioned during the interviews as proof of Nevruz’s authentic value. Government and
state officials have also made similar arguments on Nevruz days following its heritage
listing.  For  instance,  in  his  speech broadcast  live  on various TV channels  from the
official Nevruz celebrations in Ankara, 2011, the then State Minister Faruk Çelik said
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that UNESCO’s listing of Nevruz not only endorsed its authentic value, but also made it
clear  that  “it  should  be  a  duty  of  each  Turkish  citizen  to  celebrate  Nevruz in  its
authentic form, and not to permit its abuse by some exploiters.”32 
40 UNESCO, however, does not look for authenticity when inscribing cultural elements on
the intangible heritage lists. Nor is it in the spirit of the ICH Convention to approve a
certain version of an element as its authentic or original form. As Sophia Labadi points
out, this move away from the notion of authenticity marks a significant shift from the
World Heritage Convention, which recognizes authenticity as one of the key selection
criteria for the inscription on the world heritage lists (Labadi 2013: 132).33 Article 2(1) of
the ICH Convention defines intangible heritage broadly as:
… the practices,  representations,  expressions,  knowledge,  skills  –  as  well  as  the
instruments,  objects,  artefacts  and  cultural  spaces  associated  therewith  –  that
communities,  groups  and,  in  some  cases,  individuals  recognize  as  part  of  their
cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to
generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their
environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them
with  a  sense  of  identity  and  continuity,  thus  promoting  respect  for  cultural
diversity and human creativity. 
41 Within this definition, questions concerning the authenticity, ownership, and origin of
intangible  heritage  are  irrelevant.  According  to  Chiara  Bortolotto,  such  a
conceptualization of heritage is one of the most “daringly innovative” propositions of
UNESCO, reflecting a significant shift  in its  definition of  culture from one that is  a
“system  of  values  profoundly  rooted  in  the  past  and  in  land,  and  shared  by
homogeneous groups”, to one that sees culture as a “dynamic process of contingent
social  construction  that  plays  itself  out  on  local,  national,  and  global  scales”
(Bortolotto 2010: 108). Indeed, instead of considering intangible heritage as a fixed or
static construct, the Convention views it as an active living culture, placing emphasis
on  its  transmission  from  generation  to  generation  and  its  constant  recreation  by
culture bearers. It also recognizes that intangible heritage may change through time, or
because people migrate, mix, and learn from each other, it may spread over to other
parts of the world and be adopted by different cultural groups. Moreover, according to
this definition any practice, knowledge, or skill that is rooted in the cultural traditions
of people, and provides them with a sense of continuity and shared identity, can be
considered intangible heritage. In this respect, an intangible heritage element can take
on various  forms,  meanings,  and  uses  across  different  cultural  contexts,  and  these
diverse versions are not hierarchically arranged with respect to one another.
42 Such an inclusive and holistic understanding of intangible heritage, however, is not
always  reflected  on  the  ground.  National  interpretations  of  UNESCO's  heritage
programs  might  differ  greatly  from  their  original  terms  of  reference,  as  it  is  not
uncommon that these programs are used or abused by States Parties for political ends
unrelated to heritage protection (Bortolotto 2010: 108). The ICH Convention rejects the
idea of  the exclusive ownership of  intangible heritage and refrains from evaluating
cultural  elements  in  terms  of  their  authenticity  and  originality.  Nevertheless,
nationalistic understandings still dominate the intangible heritage field. For instance,
when  a  State  Party  registers  a  cultural  element  to  the  intangible  heritage  lists,  it
usually assumes itself to be officially approved by UNESCO as its authentic owner. This
may  generate  international  controversies  over  the  origin  and  ownership  of  this
element, especially when it is found within the territory of more than one country. I
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discussed  these  controversies  elsewhere  through  Turkey’s  inscription  of  Karagöz
shadow theatre and the ceremonial  keşkek dish on the Representative List  to  claim
them as authentically Turkish and to exclude Greece and Armenia (respectively) from
their ownership (Aykan 2013b).
43 The  case  of  Nevruz is  interesting  in  that,  this  time  an element’s  multinational
inscription is taken as proof of the authenticity of its state-sponsored version, i.e. this
version’s conformity with the original meaning and function of the festival as observed
in various other cultures. At the same time, Nevruz’s UNESCO listing serves as a basis for
the rejection of Newroz as the inauthentic version of the festival. In other words, the
discourse of authenticity is invoked this time for domestic political or nationalist ends,
both to delegitimize the heritage of a minority group and to justify the state-sponsored
version as the UNESCO-approved authentic tradition. 
44 There are, in fact, no obstacles against Newroz’s heritage listing according to the rules
of  the  Convention.  As  one of  the  most  significant  public  manifestations  of  Kurdish
culture providing a “sense of identity and continuity” and attracting millions of Kurds
every year, Newroz celebrations qualify for an intangible heritage listing — and may be
more  so  than  the  state-sponsored  Nevruz celebrations,  which  despite  efforts  to
disseminate the tradition more widely has not been embraced at the popular level.
However,  stateless  Kurds,  as  ethnic  minorities  divided  between  several  countries,
cannot be represented in UNESCO’s state-centered heritage system, and thus do not
have the opportunity to nominate Newroz for the intangible heritage lists. 
45 Unlike general opinion, the ICH Convention is not only about approving the universal
value of some cultural elements through a prestigious global institution. By inscribing
these elements to the UNESCO lists States Parties also commit to their safeguarding.
During the interviews the dissemination and popularization of the “authentic” Nevruz
tradition across Turkey is mentioned as fundamental for its safeguarding. As one of the
TMCT officials explained: 
Culture is a dynamic phenomenon, and in today’s conditions we cannot safeguard
Nevruz by encouraging people to have picnics on the countryside;  our aim is  to
disseminate and popularize the genuine Nevruz spirit through formal and informal
education and awareness-raising projects. 
46 Another official stated that the Ministry’s ultimate aim was to “stop organizing official
Nevruz events after ensuring that the masses could celebrate it without our support.”
The respondents often brought up the fact that official Nevruz events did not achieve
mass participation and that state and government authorities usually outnumbered the
general  public  at  them.  Interestingly  though,  neither  the  troubled history  of  the
festival in Turkey, Kurdish claims over it, nor the recent advent of official Nevruz events
were mentioned as contributory factors when discussing its lack of popularity. Instead,
Nevruz is  presented  as  a  tradition  that  has  been  forgotten  gradually  due  to
modernization and social change. According to a TMCT official:
Historically, Turks were one of the civilizations that celebrated Nevruz most vividly.
It is one of the traditional Turkish values that fell into oblivion due to the process of
modernization. This was not a conscious politics. [Emph. added] 
47 As mentioned in the previous sections, for more than three decades and prior to its
heritage  inscription,  various  state-sponsored  activities  had  already  been  organized
throughout  Turkey  to  popularize  and  disseminate  Nevruz.  These  Nevruz-themed
activities have been manifold, including but not limited to, marches, puppet and javelin
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shows,  art  exhibitions,  Mehter Band  performances,  sports  competitions,  lotteries,
concerts, and folk dance shows (Aydın 2014: 79). There have also been initiatives to
disseminate  the  Nevruz tradition  among  younger  generations.  Since  2002,  Turkish
Nevruz customs have been taught in public schools as part of the curriculum, and it has
been  celebrated  with  weeklong  activities  and  events.  Furthermore,  the  Ministry  of
National Education organizes annual nationwide “Nevruz in Turkish culture” painting,
essay, and poetry competitions for the school children sending a notice to all public
schools each year to encourage widespread student participation. 
48 I  was  told  in  the  interviews  that  the  heritage  listing  of  the  festival  had generated
additional  interest  and funding from the Turkish government for the promotion of
Nevruz at both national and international levels. The government currently sponsors
weeklong  Nevruz activities  (seminars,  panels,  sport  competitions,  concerts,  art  and
photography exhibitions,  and so forth) as a package program to be delivered in all
cities and towns throughout Turkey. The TMCT prepares information pamphlets and
brochures on the importance of  Nevruz in Turkish culture and Nevruz souvenirs for
children (Turkish flags,  Nevruz themed coloring and comic books,  t-shirts,  balloons,
etc.) to be distributed in these nation-wide events. Additionally, the Turkish national
channel TRT1 airs a daylong “Nevruz special program” on 21 March giving information
on the history of the Turkish Nevruz tradition, the meanings attributed to the festival
by ancient Turks, and the Nevruz customs and practices observed in Turkey and the
Central Asian countries. The official Nevruz celebration held in Ankara is broadcast live
as part of this program, which also presents special coverage of the celebrations from
Central  Asian  countries  as  well  as  official  celebrations  in  various  cities  and  towns
throughout Turkey. 
49 The heritage listing of Nevruz has also initiated some efforts to promote and popularize
it on an international scale. Following Kyrgyzstan’s proposal in 2010 the UN General
Assembly  recognized  March  21st as  “International  Nevruz Day”.  From that  year  on,
TURKSOY, together with the TMCT, has begun to organize annual Nevruz celebrations
throughout  the  world,  with  the  participation  of  artists  performing  folk  dances
associated with the festival from Turkey and Central Asian Republics. The first of these
events were held at  the UNESCO headquarters in Paris  and the Council  of  Europe’s
headquarters in Strasbourg.  In 2011 in addition to the Nevruz show held at  the UN
headquarters in New York, the TMCT and TURKSOY organized a four-day-long Nevruz
program featuring panels, conferences, concerts, and receptions in New York, Boston,
and Washington, DC. Similar Nevruz events were also held in Germany, Luxemburg, and
England.  Being more  than just  an occasion to  introduce the  Nevruz tradition to  an
international audience, these events also served as a platform for the justification of
Turkey’s official Nevruz policy at the international level. 
 
Conclusion
50 The case of Nevruz provides a concrete illustration of the politico-nationalistic uses of
UNESCO’s intangible heritage program, especially for those countries, such as Turkey,
struggling with diversity issues.  Despite its  original intention to depart from a top-
down heritage management approach, this program gives States Parties a “near-total
control over the meanings and uses” of intangible heritage (Lixinski 2013: 129). This
dominant role of the state in decision-making results in the use of the ICH Convention
Whose Tradition, Whose Identity? The politics of constructing “Nevruz” as int...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 19 | 2014
16
to promote a shared national heritage for the purposes of nation-building; serving, on
the one hand, to foster a unified national identity and culture, and on the other hand,
to reject the distinctiveness of minority identity and culture from the larger national
whole. 
51 The  preceding  discussion  has  explored  the  heritagisation  process  of  Nevruz as  an
extension of Turkey’s official Nevruz policy. Through the exclusion of Kurdish customs
and values and the representation of Nevruz as Turkey’s national heritage, this process
functions as a tool for delegitimizing Newroz as the politically charged and inauthentic
version of the festival. At the same time, it works to validate Nevruz as the UNESCO-
approved  authentic  tradition,  providing  a  powerful  means  of  legitimizing  Turkey’s
official  Nevruz policy at  both national  and international  levels.  The ICH Convention
aims to promote bottom-up approach to heritage management,  but  its  policies  and
discourses  are  framed  at  the  national  level  (Askew  2010:  38).  As  far  as  intangible
heritage is considered within the wider framework of the state, nation-building, and
minority  politics this  is  a  major  limitation.  Overall, UNESCO’s  intangible  heritage
program aids the efforts of States Parties to strengthen their control over the heritage
of national minorities or other marginalized groups. It is a politics that justifies the
nationalization of marginalized heritage in the name of preserving it. 
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NOTES
1. Turkey is one of these countries, having ratified the Convention in 2006. In addition to Nevruz,
Turkey has ten other cultural elements that have been inscribed on the Representative List of the
Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity so far: Arts of the Meddah, public story-tellers (2008);
Mevlevi  Sema Ceremony (2008);  Aşıklık (minstrelsy)  tradition  (2009),  Karagöz Shadow Theatre
(2009);  Alevi-Bektaşi  Semah Ritual  (2010);  Kırkpınar  Oil  Wrestling  Festival  (2010);  Traditional
Sohbet Meetings (2010),  Ceremonial  Keşkek Tradition (2011);  Mesir  Macunu Festival  (2012);  and
Turkish Coffee Culture and Tradition (2013). For more on the politics of intangible heritage in
Turkey and its particular consequences on the heritage of marginalized groups, see Aykan (2012)
and Aykan (2013a). 
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2. The ICH Convention has two lists. The principal list is called the Representative List of the
Intangible  Cultural  Heritage  of  Humanity.  This  list  includes  cultural elements  that  are
representative  of  the  world’s  cultural  diversity,  whose  viability  is  not  at  direct  risk  of
disappearance. The second list is called the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent
Safeguarding, which includes cultural elements that are in direct risk of disappearance and in
need of immediate safeguarding.
3. “Nevruz” refers to the festival’s officially used spelling in Turkey, whereas “Newroz” indicates
the Kurdish spelling of the festival, commonly used not only by Turkey’s Kurds, but also by Kurds
in  Iran,  Iraq,  and  Syria.  As  will  be  discussed  more  extensively  below,  while  the  festival’s
nomination form for  the  UNESCO intangible  heritage  listing  cites  its  alternative  spellings  in
various Middle Eastern and Asian cultures (i.e., Novruz, Nowrouz, Nooruz, Navruz, Nauroz, and
Nevruz), the Kurdish spelling of the festival is not mentioned among them. 
4. There is no consensus in the literature regarding the origin of the Kurds. In fact, as Bozarslan
(2008:  334)  states,  arguing  toward  one  exclusive  and  homogeneous  Kurdish  identity  proves
difficult  due  to  great  varieties  within  the  population  in  terms  of  language,  religion,  and
geography.  Kurds  are  Kurmanji,  Surani,  Zaza,  or  Gurani  speakers,  and the  majority  of  them
(approximately 75%) subscribe to Sunni Islam, while Alevi, Shia, and Yazidi Kurds are distinctive
minorities (McDowall 2010: 9-11). Until the early 20th century, the majority of Kurds lived in the
mountain villages  that  fell  on the border of  the Ottoman and Persian Empires.  Although no
precise  figures  for  the  Kurdish  population  exist,  their  overall  numbers  are  estimated  at
approximately 25 to 28 million (Gunter 2004: 197). While many Kurds have moved to big cities or
those seeking asylum have migrated to Europe,  the majority still  live in the area that today
corresponds to the borders of Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and there are also some enclaves of
Kurds living in Armenia and Azerbaijan (Gunter 2004: 197).
5. This  article examines the heritagisation of  Nevruz within the context of  Turkey’s  Kurdish
question. The Newroz traditions of Kurds in Iraq, Iran, and Syria, the heritagisation processes of
the  festival  in  other  countries,  and  the  different  traditions  relating  to  the  festival  as  it  is
practiced throughout Turkey by Alevis, Turkmens, or other groups, lie beyond the limits of this
study. 
6. The following discussion partially draws on five face-to-face and semi-structured interviews
with the executives and personnel of the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism Intangible
Heritage Department, the administrative body of the ICH Convention in Turkey. This department
is in charge of developing Turkey’s national intangible heritage inventory, selecting the cultural
elements to be nominated for the UNESCO’s intangible heritage lists, preparing their nomination
forms, and ensuring the safeguarding of the listed elements. The interviews were carried out
between July 2010 and July 2011 and varied in length between thirty minutes and two hours. I
have  withheld  the  names  of  the  respondents because  they  requested  that  their  names  be
removed from the publication. 
7. The World Heritage Convention has been ratified by 191 countries and has 779 listed cultural
properties as of November 2014. It is the second most ratified international convention after the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Engelhardt 2002: 29).
8. UNESCO’s Masterpieces program came into force in 2001 to raise global awareness for the
protection of intangible heritage while the ICH Convention was being drafted. The nominations
to the Masterpieces List were evaluated by an international jury of intangible heritage experts
and representatives from relevant NGOs selected by UNESCO. The program was finalized when
the ICH Convention came into force in 2006 and ninety items recorded in the Masterpieces List
were incorporated into the ICH Convention’s Representative list in 2008. 
9. Founded in 1950, Milliyet has been one of the major mainstream daily newspapers in Turkey
with a high national circulation. 
10. Milliyet, “Iranlılar Yarın Nevruzu kutlayacaklar,” 20 March 1953. 
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11. Milliyet, “Kürtlerin Protesto Mitingi,” 17 March 1977. 
12. Milliyet, “SBF Duvarlarına Kürtçe Sloganlar Yazıldı,” 22 March 1978. 
13. The incorporation of the legend of Kawa into the Newroz tradition was neither initiated by,
nor is peculiar to, Turkey’s Kurds, but rather learnt from the Kurdish nationalist movements in
Iran and Iraq. While Iraq’s Kurds were first to adopt Newroz as a national holiday in the 1950s
(Van Bruinessen 2000: 9), there are also accounts as to the efforts of Iran’s Kurdistan Democratic
Party to relate Kawa legend with Newroz during the same period (Aksoy in Aydın 2014: 76). 
14. Milliyet, “16 er, 18 sivil öldü,” 25 March 1986.
15. The deadliest Newroz occurred in 1992 when at least 70 participants died in clashes with the
security forces (Watts 2004: 5). 
16. It is interesting to note that the Syrian government employed a similar tactic from the 1980s
onwards  and  recognized  Newroz  as  a  national  celebration  in  an  attempt  to  suppress  its
popularity among the Syrian Kurds (Tejel 2009: 136).
17. Milliyet, “Nevruz’a Resmi Kutlama,” 21 March 1991. 
18. The first attempts to associate Nevruz with the Ergenekon legend can be traced back to the
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) government in the late Ottoman era. The CUP declared
Nevruz as a Turkish national festival and held official Nevruz celebrations as “Ergenekon day” in
the years of 1914 and 1915 (Karaman 2008: 132). There are also some records of minor Nevruz
celebrations after the end of CUP rule that were organized by nationalist associations during the
War of Independence (Karaman 2008: 132).
19. Milliyet, “Antalya’da Türk Kurultayı,” 22 March 1993. 
20. Milliyet, “Antalya’da Türk Kurultayı,” 22 March 1993.
21. Milliyet, “Antalya’da Türk Kurultayı,” 22 March 1993.
22. TURKSOY was established in 1993 with the aim of strengthening cultural relations among
“Turkish language speaking countries” and promoting their cultural and artistic activities at the
international  level  (TURKSOY,  “Hakkımızda,” URL:  http://www.turksoy.org.tr/tr/turksoy/
hakkimizda).  Since  then,  the  organization  has  been  working  together  with  the  Turkish
government to organize Nevruz events, dealing especially with the planning of activities as well
as the invitation and hosting of folk dance, music, and theatre groups from participant Central
Asian countries. TURKSOY’s headquarters is in Ankara and its member states are Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Uzbekistan,  Turkey,  Turkmenistan,  Altai  Republic,  Bashkortostan,
Gagauzia (Moldova), Khakassia, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Republic of Sakha
(Yakutia), Tatarstan, and Tyva. 
23. Milliyet, “Özgürce Kutladılar,” 22 March 1995. 
24. Milliyet, “Resmi Nevruz Kutlaması,” 22 March 1994. 
25. Milliyet, “Resmi Nevruz Kutlaması,” 22 March 1994.
26. Milliyet, “Başbakan Nevruz’u Iğdır’da Kutlayacak’, 19 March 1996. 
27. In her article Activists in Office: Pro-Kurdish Contentious Politics in Turkey, Nicole F. Watts argues
that participation of pro-Kurdish parties in Turkish electoral politics from the 1990s onwards
provided the Kurdish national movement with the possibility of expressing itself through non-
violent  means.  Kurdish  participation  in  the  Turkish  political  system,  however,  has  not  been
without  restriction.  Various  successive  pro-Kurdish  parties,  the  People’s  Labour  Party
(1990-1993),  the Democracy Party (1993-1994),  and the People’s  Democracy Party (1994-2003)
were closed down by the constitutional court for promoting Kurdish nationalism or due to their
connection with the PKK (Watts 2006: 134). The Democratic Society Party (2005-2009) was also
closed down by the constitutional court. Currently, Turkey’s major pro-Kurdish party is called
the Peace and Democracy Party, which succeeded the Democratic Society Party in 2009.
28. Milliyet, “2 bin 400 Gözaltı,” 23 March 1999. 
29. Serious clashes between security forces and Newroz participants occurred in 2012, when the
Ministry of  Interior did not permit the celebration of  Newroz on a Sunday.  The pro-Kurdish
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Peace and Democracy Party called for large demonstrations and thousands of Kurds poured out
onto the streets across Turkey to celebrate Newroz despite the Ministry’s decision. The security
forces tried to disperse the protestors with tear gas and water cannons. According to a report
published by the Human Rights Association, the events resulted in the death of one person, while
178 people were injured, and 1014 people were taken into custody, 206 of whom were arrested
Bianet, “Newroz  Kutlamalarında  1014  Gözaltı”, 02  April  2012,  URL:  http://bianet.org/bianet/
ifade-ozgurlugu/137364-newroz-kutlamalarinda-1014-gozalti 
30. Payvand News, “Masterpieces of the Intangible Heritage Proclaimed by UNESCO”, 12 December
2005, URL: http://www.payvand.com/news/05/dec/1185.html 12/23/05
31. “Nevruz  Celebrations  in  Turkey  and in  Central  Asia”,  URL:  http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN,
35076/nevruz-celebrations-in-turkey-and-in-central-asia.html
32. Personal notes from my participation in the official Nevruz celebrations held in Ankara Genç
lik Park on 21 March 2011. 
33. Authenticity is one of the most controversial subjects in the heritage field. UNESCO’s use of it
to  identify  world  heritage  has  been  viewed  by  critical  heritage  scholars  and  non-Western
heritage professionals as a reflection of the organization’s Western/Eurocentric interpretation of
heritage. The World Heritage Convention considered authenticity in four areas until recently,
indicating that authenticity of any property lies in its original material, design, workmanship,
and  setting  (Labadi  2010:  69).  This  conceptualization,  however,  proved  to  be  limited  in  its
application to non-Western properties. UNESCO addressed the question of authenticity at the
1994 Nara Conference held in Japan. The Conference participants adopted the Nara Document on
Authenticity, which took a cultural relativist view to the identification of world heritage. Arguing
that values attributed to heritage properties may differ from culture to culture and even within
the  same  culture,  paragraph  11  of  the  document  stated  that  heritage  properties  should  be
understood within their cultural context and their authenticity should not be evaluated through
fixed  criteria.  The  document  also  argued  for  a  broader  understanding  of  the  concept  of
authenticity, stating in paragraph 13 that authenticity of a property not only lies in its design,
material, workmanship, and setting but also in its use, function, traditions, techniques, spirit,
and feeling. The World Heritage Committee, however, did not modify the Operational Guidelines
according to the Nara document until its 2005 revision (Labadi 2010: 71).
ABSTRACTS
This article problematizes the tendency of States Parties to use UNESCO’s 2003 Convention for
the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage as a political tool for nation-building. Having
overall control and authority over the administration and implementation of this Convention,
States Parties often use it to promote an official version of intangible heritage to foster national
identity and unity. Such state dominance may in some cases result in strengthening the state’s
control  over  the  heritage  of  minority  groups  and  contribute  to  the  appropriation  of  their
heritage as national heritage, becoming a means to reject their identities and cultures. I discuss
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